War in Ukraine: A stress test for US, German relations

WASHINGTON: If it feels like Groundhog Day, it’s not just because the American holiday is this week. The laboured decision by Western allies to send Ukraine their main battle tanks is just the most recent iteration of a pattern of support that kicked off with Russia’s invasion almost one year ago.

What starts as a hard no, whether to heavy weaponry, advanced air defense, or top-tier armored vehicles, slowly softens to a yes, but only after weeks of negotiations, technical excuses, and efforts among allies to show unity even as those that want to move faster put pressure on more reluctant partners.

For the United States and Germany, the alliance’s largest members particularly in terms of economic might, industrial capacity, and purchasing power, the question of how and how much to help Ukraine defend itself has coloured the bilateral relationship in new ways. And that is also just one part of a much more complex, global picture.

After the bullying years of President Donald Trump, his successor Joe Biden has taken a catch-more-flies-with-honey approach to European allies. Rather than a “strategy of blame,” he and his administration have shown patience and frequently praised Germany for its contributions. That is also an effort to give Germany the diplomatic “cover” it needs to make uncomfortable policy decisions, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, senior expert with the German Marshall Fund’s Berlin office said.

Most recently, Biden publicly complimented Chancellor Olaf Scholz for his “steadfast commitment” to Ukraine and credited Germany for having “stepped up.” Behind closed doors, however, Kleine-Brockhoff said, the debate over the recent issue of battle tank deliveries took on a different tone.

“The German chancellor put pressure on the Americans and said, ‘I will not before you do.’” Kleine-Brockhoff explained. “That has caused some irritation on the Washington side,” especially because the US has refrained from pushing Germany.

Although Biden denied that pressure from Scholz forced him to change his mind on sending US Abrams tanks, the weeks-long exchange was a reminder of the German need for its bigger ally to show its hand before it feels it can reveal its own. Policymakers in Washington have now realised “how much the Germans actually want to be following, not leading,” Kleine-Brockhoff said.

For Scholz’s critics, that seems to contradict his blustery address to the Bundestag, the German parliament, just days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last February. In it, he declared a “Zeitenwende” — a historic turning point — that demanded a significant boost in military spending and a more robust security policy. “It took a war for the Germans to shift course” on long-simmering “irritants” in the US-German relationship, Kleine-Brockhoff said.

For the Americans, those were Germany’s resistance to higher military spending — that had been falling short of the NATO agreement of 2% of GDP — and its Nord Stream gas projects with Russia. Germany, for its part, was irked by the idea that an ally would threaten sanctions to deter from that energy deal.

Those issues have since fallen by the wayside, as has Germany’s domestic debate about its participation in NATO “nuclear sharing,” a policy that puts US nuclear weapons on German soil and requires German aircraft to carry them.