Editorial: Strange bedfellows

Last week, Prime Minister Modi met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow, in a reunion that sought to deepen their relationship. Modi’s ‘bilateral’ visit to Moscow, a longtime partner for New Delhi, was his first since the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine. The rendezvous transpired alongside NATO leaders gathering in Washington even as Russia launched missile attacks, some of which hit a children’s hospital in Ukraine. Even as PM Modi has opted to steer clear of directly condemning Russia for what the Western alliance termed is a breach of military rules of engagement, he emphasised the need for a peaceful settlement.

Amid global ostracisation of Russia over the Ukraine war, Russia has moved closer to China. Political observers had remarked that New Delhi is enmeshed in an increasingly complicated partnership with Moscow. Recall that Modi had not attended the summit of the SCO (a security group founded by Moscow and Beijing) that was held in the first week of July in Kazakhstan. India's attempt to cosy up to Russia, even as Moscow curried favour with Beijing was noticed by the Western allies too. US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan recently cautioned New Delhi against betting on Russia as a long-term, reliable partner.

He emphasised that the Kremlin was turning into a junior partner to China, and that it would side with Beijing over New Delhi in the event of a conflict arising between the two Asian giants. The comments assume significance considered in the backdrop of the ice-cold rapport shared by New Delhi and Beijing. A confrontation in June 2020 along the disputed China-India border had dealt a body blow to diplomatic ties. But then, does such posturing by the Sino-Russian combine, aimed at offering a counterbalance to an unpredictable US indicate acquiescence by Moscow to Beijing?

Experts believe such fears are unfounded as Russia on its own has stood up to the powerful NATO alliance, with regard to Ukraine, and remained unfazed in the face of 16,000 western economic embargoes. Russia’s considerable military might puts it in a league of its own, and it’s nowhere in the vicinity of allowing China to dictate terms. The Kremlin’s current action plans involve offsetting the US influence on NATO, and by extension, Europe. Moscow is also keen on mobilising the nations in the Global South with an aim to create an equitable, multipolar world order.

India’s historic affinity with Russia hinges on a slew of economic and security concerns. Following sanctions imposed by the US and its allies which closed off most Western markets to Russian exports, India and China emerged as key buyers of Russian oil. New Delhi now procures over 40% of its oil imports from Russia. Trade between the two nations has also spiked by 66% last year, and the goal is to hit $100 billion in bilateral trade by 2030 — up from nearly $65 billion last year.

The heightened camaraderie is also a fallout of the transactional relationship shared by New Delhi and Washington, the latter of which views India purely as a means to an end — an interloper of sorts in its crusade against Chinese expansionism. The recent visit of US Rep Nancy Pelosi’s delegation to Dharamshala, where she met with the Dalai Lama, was viewed as an instance of Washington training its guns on Beijing, while mounting its barrel on India’s shoulders. New Delhi might do well to remember Sun Tzu’s adage — to keep one’s friends close, and its adversaries even closer.