Europe's Democrats must forge a will to fight

Wojciech Przybylski & Goran Buldioski

With America’s commitment to upholding its European allies’ security in serious doubt, and revisionist powers like China and Russia increasingly emboldened, the European Union is scrambling to strengthen its capacity to defend itself. But this effort could be thwarted by a fundamental paradox: while Europeans cherish peace, they largely lack the resolve to fight for it.

A recent report highlights the scale of this disconnect. Though half of young people in France, Germany, and Spain, as well as the United Kingdom, expect armed conflict within a decade, only one-third would fight to defend their countries. Across the EU, only 32% of adults say they would be willing to take up arms, including just 23% of Germans and 14% of Italians.

The problem is not simply that Europeans have embraced pacifism. Rather, the EU is beset by a dangerous complacency: decades of reliance on the United States have fostered a widespread belief that security is guaranteed, not earned. But Donald Trump’s administration has made it clear that Europe can no longer count on the US to defend it. With security threats proliferating – exemplified by Russia’s war in Ukraine and China’s saber-rattling in the Indo-Pacific – Europe must cultivate a collective will to fight.

If this effort is to safeguard, and even strengthen, European democracies, it must be rooted not in aggressive nationalism – which creates fertile ground for anti-democratic forces to thrive – but in a sense of civic duty and economic pragmatism. This is not about militarizing society, but about empowering it to defend itself, thereby upholding the freedom, stability, and prosperity that Europeans so value.

The first step is for Europe to rethink its approach to military engagement. Conscription, while effective in Scandinavia or the Baltics, will not work in every European context. Instead, governments should introduce flexible, accessible military-training programs – think short-term courses on cybersecurity, drone operation, or survival skills – that double as pathways to employment. With some countries, like Sweden and Spain, having 25% of youth unemployed or underemployed, linking military service to certifications in high-demand fields like engineering or logistics could enhance its appeal substantially, particularly to voters who value upward mobility.

Such initiatives should also capitalize on the interests of young Europeans, not least their enthusiasm for military-themed video games that resemble war simulations. Pilot programs in Estonia, where cyber-defense training has bolstered both security and tech employment, offer a useful model.

Fostering sustained support for increased military spending – including for the European Commission’s welcome initiative to unlock trillions of euros that are currently sitting idle in savings accounts – will require a similar reframing. The traditional “guns versus butter” framework, which pits security against social-welfare spending, is not only alienating; it is also wrong. Far from eroding Europe’s economic well-being, investment in defense would bolster a powerful engine of growth and prosperity. Already, the EU’s defense sector employs more than 500,000 people and generates at least €150 billion ($166 billion) annually. The success of companies like Germany’s Rheinmetall, whose stock price has doubled since the beginning of the year, shows just how profitable security investments can be.

But changing the narrative about military spending will require more than communicating facts; policies that directly link defense to people’s social and economic well-being are essential. For example, governments could introduce subsidies for military families or tax breaks for defense-sector workers.

Moreover, innovative financial instruments – such as “national freedom bonds” (with guaranteed returns) or an exchange-traded fund for European defense (with similar guarantees) – could mobilize domestic capital, while giving citizens a greater stake in their own security while earning some profit. France’s social bonds and Italy’s tax-advantaged savings instruments show how this can work. Applying this model of profitable patriotism to defense could raise billions of euros.

All of this will require political leadership, with Europe’s mainstream parties championing military preparedness not as a show of aggression, but as a bulwark for freedom and the rule of law in open societies. Unfortunately, European liberals are still clinging to the “anti-politics” mindset once championed by the likes of the late Czech dissident-turned-president Václav Havel. While this approach was appropriate in the fight against communism, it is hampering Europe’s ability to confront the threats of today, while enabling populists who flirt with appeasement to gain ground. Public figures, educators, and the media must also contribute to fostering the necessary shift in mindset.

Europe’s security landscape is changing fast. To navigate it effectively, the EU must integrate defense into a broader pro-democracy agenda in which military service is a practical, appealing option for young people, defense spending is linked to economic well-being, and political leaders make a compelling case for military preparedness. Without such a push, the world’s revisionist powers will increasingly dictate the terms of engagement, and the vision of a peaceful, stable, and united Europe will fade iento history.

Wojciech Przybylski is Editor of Visegrad Insight and president of the Res Publica Foundation in Warsaw. Goran Buldioski is a senior fellow at the Hertie School in Berlin