Putin’s problem Options for managing Wagner aren’t great

For years, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s sprawling private army has quietly acted as a proxy for Russian foreign policy. The Wagner force’s network of thousands of Russian mercenaries installed in Latin America, the Middle East and Africa have helped the Kremlin secure natural resources and project influence in failed states and conflict zones, while allowing President Vladimir Putin of Russia to conveniently distance himself from the group’s unsavoury alliances and ruthless tactics.

In Syria and Libya, Wagner fighters prop up strongmen like Bashar al-Assad and Khalifa Haftar in exchange for profits accrued from the oil and gas installations the mercenaries help protect. In Madagascar and Sudan, Wagner has advised governments on stamping out protests, started disinformation campaigns and meddled in elections. In Mali and the Central African Republic, military juntas rely on Wagner for regime security, while Wagner extracts gold, diamonds and timber, and wages counterinsurgency campaigns against jihadist groups affiliated with Al Qaeda and the Islamic State.

But Prigozhin’s failed mutiny exposed Russia’s dysfunctional dependence on Wagner and other private military companies, raising questions about the future of Russian global influence. The upheaval has sent the Kremlin scrambling to position the Russian state to maintain Wagner’s far-flung influence and cash flow — and trying to dispel Putin’s own notion that Prigozhin’s army was an autonomous entity at all. Days after the doomed uprising, Putin proclaimed that Wagner was entirely funded by the Russian state, to the tune of billions of dollars.

With Prigozhin now reportedly in exile in Belarus, Putin faces a few choices for how to deal with thousands of Wagner mercenaries scattered around the world. None are likely to play out well for Russia. In a speech to the nation early last week, Putin said that Wagner fighters who did not participate in the coup attempt were free to sign a contract with the Russian military under the command of the Ministry of Defense. (Those who did participate could join Prigozhin in Belarusian exile.) But the mandate for Wagner mercenaries to sign a contract with the Russian Ministry of Defense — a policy Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu tried to put in place in early June — was one of the primary factors contributing to Prigozhin’s mutiny attempt, and isn’t likely to be a popular choice for his troops.

Even if Wagner fighters do decide to join Russian military units en masse, it won’t be easy for Moscow to integrate them. Wagner forces already have a well-deserved reputation for brutality, are alleged to have committed war crimes and crimes against humanity in several theaters and have been credibly accused of torture, kidnapping and executing civilians.

Another option would be for Putin to leave Wagner’s overseas operations as is, and install a new leader to replace Prigozhin. That would avoid disrupting Moscow’s foreign policy agenda and reassure its client states that Russia remains a reliable partner. Wagner’s African footprint is vast, with ongoing activities in Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, South Africa, Zimbabwe and Kenya. When asked immediately after the failed uprising what would happen to Wagner’s presence in Africa, Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, announced that Russian “instructors” would continue working in Mali and the Central African Republic. Russia has since dispatched officials to various spots where Wagner operates to reassure those governments, including Syria and Mali, that there will be no disruption in Russian assistance.

Clarke is the director of research at an intelligence consulting firm in NYC

The New York Times