The war within: US-Russia-China ties to tip Myanmar's fortunes

Tharaphi Than

While the United States talked about military assistance and minerals with Ukraine, Russia did the same with one of its few remaining allies: Myanmar.

On March 4, 2025, the commander in chief and leader of Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing, visited Russia. It was his fourth official visit since a coup in 2021 saw the military seize power.

That coup ended a decade-long power-sharing arrangement between the army and the democratically elected government in Myanmar, sparking peaceful protests that soon developed into a nationwide armed resistance known as the Spring Revolution and an ensuing government crackdown.

The resulting civil war – now into its fourth year – has seen 6,000-plus people killed, 29,000 arrested and more than 3.3 million displaced, according to estimates from the human rights group Assistance Association for Political Prisoners. The conflict pits the country’s military, which has had a stranglehold on Myanmar’s politics for much of the past six decades, against a broad-based opposition that includes ethnic minority groups.

With seemingly no immediate end to the fighting in sight, all sides are becoming increasingly reliant on foreign suppliers of weapons and fuel. This prompts an important question: Could the shifting policies and alignments of global powers – notably China, Russia and the US – tip the balance of Myanmar’s civil war?

Russia: Myanmar’s ‘forever friend’

Throughout the civil war, Myanmar’s generals have turned to Russia for support. Both nations are heavily sanctioned and seen as “pariah states,” so it is, in many ways, a convenient alignment.

In his latest visit to Moscow, Min Aung Hlaing granted Russia rights to extract minerals in Myanmar’s conflict zones and build an oil refinery and a port in the coastal city of Dawei.

Russia has exported oil to Myanmar for many decades. Since the invasion of Ukraine, Moscow has been using the Southeast Asian country as a route to transport oil to China in an attempt to mitigate the impact of Western sanctions on energy exports. Myanmar has also agreed to supply skilled workers to Russia in a deal to alleviate the country’s labour shortages. This mutual arrangement also extends to defence and security matters.

But any diplomatic benefit from having Russia as a sponsor has been blunted due to Moscow’s loss of international support over the war in Ukraine. Should that change, as the new US administration seems keen on, then it could benefit Myanmar’s military by giving the generals a stronger ally on the international stage.

As such, warming relations between Russia and the US could be to the detriment of Myanmar’s myriad opposition groups. Already, the Trump administration’s policies mean that the resistance can no longer rely on the same level of support from Washington, and it’s no guarantee that European Union countries would step in to fill the gap.

US pivots away from Myanmar

Washington has nominally supported the Spring Revolution.

The US provides shelter to Myanmar dissidents, including exiled leaders of the National Unity Government, or NUG, and has pushed for sanctions against the army.

But that support has been largely symbolic. The US still has not officially recognized the NUG as the legitimate government of Myanmar – a decision that prevents Washington from releasing $1 billion held at the Federal Reserve to the democratic representatives. That money could be used both to bolster the resistance and deliver much-needed aid to the country’s people.

US foreign policy as it evolves under the Trump administration is having further ripples in Myanmar.

Trump has gutted the US Agency for International Development, the department tasked with funding Myanmar through 2023’s Burma Act, which authorized sanctions on the military, support for those opposing the junta and assistance for Myanmar’s people. Services such as Voice of America and Radio Free Asia have been suspended amid the recent US cutbacks. As a result, people in Myanmar have more limited access to reliable information and, more importantly, fewer media to represent and amplify their voices.

Chinese push for stability

The US administration’s reduction in aid and, potentially, support for Myanmar’s opposition could lead the way to China taking a greater role in shaping the course of the civil war.

Beijing, like Washington, had traditionally had a close relationship with the opposition NLD. President Xi Jinping visited Myanmar in 2020 and signed a series of infrastructure deals as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

After the 2021 coup, China initially drew back from supporting Myanmar. But Beijing has since attempted to revive stalled or cancelled bilateral projects while supporting reconciliation efforts and positioning itself as a neutral mediator.

China’s main concern is spillover from the war. For that reason, Beijing became concerned when an alliance of armed ethnic groups launched a major anti-military push in October 2023, fearing the spread of instability across the China-Myanmar border. But a rushed ceasefire born of necessity does not equate to a lasting solution. As such, the shifting geopolitics of Russia, the US and China may impact Myanmar’s civil war – but it will do little to encourage democracy in the country, nor put it on a path to lasting peace.