Citing urgency, HC agrees to hear Madras Race Club’s suit against lease termination

CHENNAI: Holding that the civil suit moved by the Madras Race Club (MRC) challenging the State's order terminating the lease as an urgent matter, the Madras High Court allowed it to dispense with issuing pre-suit notice as per norms and directed the registry to list the case.

As per section 80 (2) of the Code of Civil Proceedings (CPC), there is an urgency to dispense with notice, said Justice RMT Teekaa Raman and allowed the club’s application seeking leave to file the suit without serving the two months’ pre-suit notice.

On September 9, the Chennai Collector and Revenue Department closed the premises encompassing the 160.8-acre land, as the management failed to pay the rental dues. The club immediately moved the civil suit challenging the lease termination and requested the court to hear the matter urgently without the prior notice mandate.

Representing the club, senior counsel AL Somayaji said the lease agreement between MRC and the then government was for 99 years, which expires only in 2045. Noting that the club paid the entire lease amount, he argued that the State cannot terminate the lease.

Also objecting to the State’s counter that it had taken possession of the land, Somayaji said it was incorrect and made with the wrong perception. To buttress his contention that the club was in possession of the land, he pointed out that it conducted horse races twice even after the termination order was issued.

He then submitted that as per section 80 (2) of CPC, granting leave from issuing the pre-suit notice was completely discretionary of the court, and sought the court to consider the grave urgency of the matter, as more than 1,000 workers were dependent on the club.

Countering the arguments on behalf of the State, senior counsel Dushyant Dave said according to section 80 (2), issuing a pre-suit notice was absolutely necessary. As the club violated the lease agreement, the State terminated it, he said, referring to section 108 (A) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, which empowers the State to re-enter the leased out property as the lease agreement would automatically be terminated in such resumption.

Citing the State’s right to re-enter and possess the land, he said the suit was not maintainable and sought its dismissal.