Horn of Africa: Strategic port deal could trigger conflict
Since the political prize was nothing less than Ethiopia taking steps towards recognising Somaliland as a sovereign state, serious repercussions have followed.
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ADDIS ABABA: Under different circumstances, the kind of deal agreed between Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland would have been relatively straightforward. One country grants its landlocked neighbour access to a seaport and, by extension, to international trade and, in return, is rewarded a political prize. But Somaliland is just a de facto country, with closer diplomatic ties only to Taiwan. And since the political prize was nothing less than Ethiopia taking steps towards recognising Somaliland as a sovereign state, serious repercussions have followed.
The Somali government in Mogadishu has called its ambassador to Addis Ababa for consultation and released a statement emphasizing that its constitutional power also extends to Somaliland, calling the agreement “null and void.” “Somalia finds this step to be a clear violation against its sovereignty and unity,” the statement read. At the epicenter of the deal is the commercial port of Berbera, which has recently been significantly expanded by DP World, a port logistics company based in the United Arab Emirates.
Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had been calling for sea access for months, his rhetoric leading to fears of a fresh dispute with neighboring Eritrea. However, the Somali government in Mogadishu, which has little control over the northwestern breakaway province, was surprised when Ethiopia and Somaliland struck their deal on New Year’s Day. Besides using the port for international trade, Ethiopia also wants to lease land from Somaliland to build a naval base. Somaliland, in return, gets an equivalent value in shares of Ethiopian Airlines. Moreover, Abiy’s government promises to “make an in-depth assessment towards taking a position regarding the efforts of Somaliland to gain recognition.”
While the deal’s wording leaves much room for interpretation, any diplomatic revaluation for Somaliland’s cause would further weaken the Somali central government in Mogadishu. “This signing of a memorandum of understanding will upside down the relationship of the two countries back to the era of Siad Barre administration,” Surafeal Getahun, who teaches political and international relations at Dire Dawa University in Eastern Ethiopia, told DW. “This leads the entire region to a great crisis. And it will endanger the relationship between the countries in the region.”
Somalia unsuccessfully attempted to reconquer the Ogaden border region from Ethiopia during the 22-year reign of Siad Barre, who was Somalia’s dictator until 1991.
In addition to the full-scale war in 1977-78, Somalia has deployed rebel militias in what is now Ethiopia’s Somali region. However, there’s reason to doubt that Mogadishu would engage in an armed confrontation with Ethiopia, a country whose military spending is three times higher and is part of the coalition fighting the Al-Shabab militant organisation within Somalia.
“What can they do with their big neighbour?” asked Medhane Tadesse, who lectures at King’s College in London and Institut des Mondes Africains in Paris. “They might be involved in destabilisation strategies by working with other countries like Gulf powers, probably supporting being a gateway for Ethiopian insurgent groups. But mainly, I think their main agency would be international diplomacy,” Tadesse told DW. Somalia has received backing from the European Union, the United States and the African Union, which have supported its territorial integrity.
According to Tadesse, the issue is directly connected with regional geopolitics, namely with a Saudi-led security initiative founded in 2020 with other Red Sea countries.
“Both the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia are not part of it,” Tadesse pointed out. “There has been some kind of evolution of two broad camps. And Ethiopia and Somalia are not in the same camp.”
The UAE has been playing an active role in the Saudi-led intervention in the Yemeni civil war. The UAE holds influence in the south of the war-struck country, mainly through local groups.
Just 250 km further south lies the port of Berbera. With another ally, the UAE would increase its influence on both sides of the Gulf of Aden, the gateway to the global trade route through the Red Sea and Suez Canal. As Tadesse explained, teaming up with Ethiopia makes sense for the UAE for various reasons. “They wanted the hinterland. They wanted that access. But more than that, it’s the security component as well. It’s an alliance making. It’s easy for the Emirates to work with Ethiopia for their own interest,” said Tadesse.
