CRS recommends AI-based signal detection, KAVACH implementation on top priority

CHENNAI: The Chief Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) probing the collision involving Kanchanjunga Express and a goods train in Northeastern Frontier Railway zone on June 17 has recommended the use of Artificial Intelligence-based detection of RED signal and implementation of automatic train-protection system (KAVACH) on top priority to optimise safety.

The CRS, which functions under the Civil Aviation Ministry, concluded in its statutory report that "lapses at multiple levels in managing train operations" under automatic signal failures contributed to the accident that claimed 10 lives and left scores injured.

AI-based signal detection, GPS sync to prevent life loss

In the statutory preliminary report (copy available with DT Next), Northeastern Railway CRS Janak Kumar Garg concluded that as many as 208 cases of signal passing at danger (SPAD) occurred between April 1, 2019 and March 31, 2024. Of them, 12 resulted in collision, highlighting the limitations of preventive measures taken by the zonal (NE) railways (counselling of loco pilots/assistant LPs, safety drives).

The cases underscore the need for the implementation of KAVACH on top priority, it said, recommending the Ministry to explore the use of non-signalling-based systems such as AI-based detection of the RED aspect of the signal and provide an early warning to the LP/ALPs and GPS-based anti-collision systems for provision in locomotive cabs across Railways in non-ATP territory.

Besides suggesting a probable change in the policy of procuring walkie-talkies provided to the LPs and train managers, he also advised the board to ensure that conversations made by the station masters through the walkie-talkie are recorded by providing VHF receiver-cum-recorder in datalogger room.

Recommending a review of the crashworthiness of passenger coaches in reference to EN15227 (European standard for crashworthiness requirements for railway coaches) on priority, he suggested that at least the last two coaches of every passenger-carrying train should have crash-worthiness feature as per EN-15227 and all new coaches should be manufactured with crash-worthiness features and existing coaches shall be retrofitted during major schedules of coaches (maintenance).

The CRS has advised the board to convert around 500 lCF coaches of different types manufactured with crash-worthiness features into sleeper sitting-cum-luggage (SLR rake) coaches and attach them at either end of the rake to minimise loss of human life and property. One of the recommendations in the report was the synchronisation of all systems such as Datalogger, VCU of locomotive, control office clock and station master clock with GPS.

Accident classified under "errors in train working" category

The provisional findings listed the issue of T/A 912, instead of T/D 912 in case of all signals failure, non-issuing of stipulated caution order and non-availability of walkie-talkies with the loco pilot and train manager of the goods trains, failure of the station manager to take the signature of the train manager on authority operating form (T/A 912 for Signal Passing at Danger) and inadequate counselling of loco pilots and stations masters about train operating in Automatic Signalling Territory creating misinterpretation and misunderstanding of rules as the 'errors' in train working.

Responding to the report, loco pilots, who are mostly at the receiving end during accidents, said it was probably one of the rare occasions when the systemic failure in train operations has been faulted instead of blaming a few individuals after a deadly accident.