Rebuilding Afghanistan

One of the many problems, but something that could have huge ramifications for the manner in which things play out, is the schisms within. The biggest fault line here is the divide within the Taliban, between the factions led by Abdul Ghani Baradar and the Pakistani-sponsored Haqqani Network. The differences, which have held up government formation, relate to fundamental issues such as who will head the government as well as ideological matters such as how inclusive and minority-friendly the new dispensation should be. Clashes in Kabul and unverified reports that a badly-injured Baradar has been rushed to Pakistan for treatment, and the sudden visit of Pakistan’s ISI chief to Kabul, point towards a thorny set of problems that will not be easy to resolve.

At the same time, the civil war in Afghanistan continues with the Taliban (helped along by Pakistan) engaged in snuffing out the largest pocket of resistance in the Panjshir Valley, where the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmad Massoud and Amrullah Saleh, is holed up. There are conflicting reports about successes and setbacks, but any lasting solution will require mediation between the Pashtuns, who make up the Taliban, and the Panjshiris, who are classified as Tajiks, but have a distinct identity.

The recent developments highlight an old truth – that Afghanistan always was and remains a complex mosaic of tribal and regional warlords. The big issue is to find a delicate way of negotiating a labyrinth of loyalties – to kin, tribe, clan – while knitting together a government. The promise of an inclusive government is a start, but that still leaves open questions of representation, power-sharing and ideological accommodation – issues that have plagued Afghanistan for years.

Irrespective of Islamabad’s protestations, there is little doubt that the Taliban is a Pakistani creation, protected and encouraged by the ISI. However, the relationship between the two is complex and layered. This is reflected in the division between those who have captured power – between those who want to be more independent and more grounded in an Afghan nationalism and others, foremost amongst them Khalil Haqqani, who are tied too closely to extricate themselves from Pakistan’s deep state. Much will depend on how Islamabad handles the issue, something that will have ramifications not only for Afghanistan but also for terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, and ipso facto other countries as well.

A failure to find a peaceful and acceptable solution will have many consequences. It will plunge Afghanistan into the kind of civil wars that have plagued it in the past, causing misery, pain and death. Such chaos will also allow terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and the IS to use disorder to their advantage. In the long run, it is crystal clear that a stable Afghanistan will be one in which all groups and religious denominations are represented – Pashtuns, Hazaras, Tajiks, Hindus and other religious minorities, and, of course, women.