An African Conundrum: Conflict brewing over port deal
One country grants its landlocked neighbour access to a seaport and, by extension, to international trade and, in return, is rewarded a political prize. But Somaliland is just a de facto country
Representative Image
SOMALIA: Under different circumstances, the kind of deal agreed between Ethiopia and the breakaway region of Somaliland would have been relatively straightforward. One country grants its landlocked neighbour access to a seaport and, by extension, to international trade and, in return, is rewarded a political prize. But Somaliland is just a de facto country.
And since the political prize was nothing less than Ethiopia taking steps towards recognizing Somaliland as a sovereign state, serious repercussions have followed. The Somali government in Mogadishu has called its ambassador to Addis Ababa for consultation. On Saturday, President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed a law nullifying the agreement. In a social media post, he described his move as an “illustration of our commitment to safeguard our unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity as per international law.” From a Somali point of view, this would make all further steps by Ethiopia and Somaliland illegal.
At the epicenter of the deal is the commercial port of Berbera, which has recently been significantly expanded by DP World, a port logistics company based in the United Arab Emirates. Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed had been calling for sea access for months, his rhetoric leading to fears of a fresh dispute with neighboring Eritrea. However, the Somali government in Mogadishu, which has little control over the northwestern breakaway province, was surprised when Ethiopia and Somaliland struck their deal on New Year’s Day.
Besides using the port for international trade, Ethiopia also wants to lease land from Somaliland to build a naval base. Somaliland, in return, gets an equivalent value in shares of Ethiopian Airlines. Moreover, Abiy’s government promises to “make an in-depth assessment towards taking a position regarding the efforts of Somaliland to gain recognition.” While the deal’s wording leaves much room for interpretation, any diplomatic revaluation for Somaliland’s cause would further weaken the Somali central government in Mogadishu.
“This signing of a memorandum of understanding will upside down the relationship of the two countries back to the era of Siad Barre administration,” Surafal Getahun, who teaches political and international relations at Dire Dawa University in Eastern Ethiopia, told DW. “This leads the entire region to a great crisis. And it will endanger the relationship between the countries in the region.”
Somalia unsuccessfully attempted to reconquer the Ogaden border region from Ethiopia during the 22-year reign of Siad Barre, who was Somalia’s dictator until 1991. In addition to the full-scale war in 1977-78, Somalia has deployed rebel militias in what is now Ethiopia’s Somali region. However, there’s reason to doubt that Mogadishu would engage in an armed confrontation with Ethiopia, a country whose military spending is three times higher and is part of the coalition fighting the Al-Shabab militant organisation within Somalia.
“What can they do with their big neighbour?” asked Medhane Tadesse, who lectures at King’s College in London and Institut des Mondes Africains in Paris. “They might be involved in destabilisation strategies by working with other countries like Gulf powers, probably supporting being a gateway for Ethiopian insurgent groups. But mainly, I think their main agency would be international diplomacy,” Tadesse told DW.
