Is the war in Ukraine any less likely?

As long as foreign leaders are in Kyiv for talks, Putin can’t possibly launch an invasion,” ordinary Ukrainians will tell you, a sentiment often delivered with a hopeful smile. Certainly, the unprecedented flurry of diplomatic activity in recent weeks does sometimes feel like a desperate attempt to buy time in the crisis around the Russian build-up of troops along Ukraine’s borders, by talking, about anything and everything  however slim the chances of making progress.

Within the space of just a few days this past week, Ukraine’s capital played host to leaders from the United Kingdom, Turkey, Poland and the Netherlands. So relentless was the onslaught of foreign dignitaries that Dutch Prime Minister Rutte’s visit was reportedly postponed by a day to make way for UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson. All came to Kyiv with promises of weapons for the country’s military and strong words of warning for Moscow. Ukrainian presidents used to complain about too little attention for their country and its standoff with Russia; now, it seems like a little too much for comfort.

But the position of the European Union’s most influential member states, France and Germany, has been far less clear-cut. Ukrainian leaders fear that Paris and Berlin will prove less willing to throw their weight behind Kyiv, and more likely to cut a deal with Moscow at Ukraine’s expense. German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock arrived in Ukraine for the second time in the space of a month. This comes against a backdrop of growing tensions between the two countries, both over Germany’s refusal to provide Ukraine with lethal weapons and to impose pre-emptive sanctions on Russia’s Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. At least in public, Baerbock had little in the way of new initiatives to offer her Ukrainian hosts: no road map to de-escalation beyond a commitment to get Russia and Ukraine back to the negotiating table.

Why those talks would now succeed, after years of deadlock, she failed to explain, instead hailing the resumption of technical talks as a success in and of itself. Short on concrete policy announcements, the public part of her visit was focused on underscoring Germany’s commitment to Ukraine and trying to regain lost goodwill. In Kyiv and on her visit to the front lines in Donbass, Baerbock repeatedly made the point that Ukraine could rely on Germany — although she failed to spell out details her Ukrainian audience clearly expected.

Rather than clarify what it would take for Berlin to impose sanctions against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, Baerbock made mention of “unprecedented” sanctions Germany would impose on Russia in the event of invasion, and repeated how Germany would be willing to pay a “high price” in terms of its own economic ties with Russia.

The latter constituted a response to criticism levelled against German foreign policy in recent weeks, accusing the industrial heavyweight of prioritising economic interests with Russia over solidarity with Ukraine. Expectations in Kyiv were particularly high since Baerbock’s Green Party has in recent years been both more critical of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project and also more hawkish on Russia than any other in the Bundestag. What was missing was the subject most eagerly expected by Ukrainian observers: Kyiv’s renewed request for the delivery of lethal weapons. This topic had gained particular emotional weight after Germany’s offer of 5,000 helmets was widely ridiculed in Ukraine.

Looking at this situation from Kyiv, it seems a win-win resolution to this crisis that both Ukraine and Russia could accept does not exist. Either Russia will be convinced to back down by the threat of massive sanctions at considerable risk to Putin’s credibility, or Ukraine will be pressured into fulfilling Russia’s demands at the risk of massive domestic backlash. For now, neither side seems willing to compromise. But many in Kyiv are convinced that, sooner or later, Western countries will pile on the pressure on Ukraine.